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Jurisdictional Statement 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4- l 03(2)( e ). 
Introduction 
In 2010, Mr. Nielsen pied guilty to theft and was ordered to pay restitution. Mr. 
Nielsen has complied with that order and to date, has paid over $106,000 in restitution. 
Under Utah law, a trial court has a nondiscretionary duty to make two restitution 
determinations: (I) complete restitution; and (2) court-ordered restitution. Complete 
restitution' means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by 
the defendant. Court-ordered restitution' means the restitution the court orders the 
® defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence. In determining "complete restitution," 
the trial court is required to review several statutory restitution factors and support its 
determination with findings of fact. While "complete restitution" cannot be adjusted in 
any way, "court-ordered" restitution can be adjusted into an installment payment plan to 
take the defendant's ability to pay into account. 
In this case, the trial court did not review the statutory restitution factors, did not 
make findings of fact to support the restitution order, and even ordered Mr. Nielsen to 
pay restitution in installments by paying 25% of his income towards restitution. Thus, the 
@ trial court clearly entered "court-ordered" restitution and never determined "complete 
restitution." This distinction is important because only orders of "complete restitution" 
may be entered on the civil judgment docket. When the trial court ordered "court-
@) ordered" restitution in 2010, Mr. Nielsen rightfully believed and expected that the 
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restitution amount would never, and could never, be converted into a civil judgment. 
Indeed, because the trial court never reviewed the restitution factors, never made findings ® 
of fact, and never determined complete restitution, he had no reason or cause to object to 
the hypothetical entry of a civil judgment. 
However, more than five years later the State requested that the trial court enter ~ 
civil judgment in the amount of the unpaid restitution. Mr. Nielsen objected, arguing that 
a civil judgment could not be entered because the trial court never entered an order of 
"complete restitution" in 20 I 0. The trial court acknowledged that it never determined 
complete restitution, but nevertheless ordered that a civil judgment could be entered 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) on the grounds that the trial court's failure to 
determine complete restitution was a "clerical" error. Because the trial court lost 
jurisdiction to enter an order of complete restitution a year after sentencing occurred 
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(d)(i)), the only way for the trial court to enter a civil 
judgment was to find that a Rule 30(b) "clerical error" had occurred. 
First, because only orders of complete restitution can be entered on the civil 
judgment docket, the trial court erred by entering a civil judgment because it never 
previously determined complete restitution. Second, the trial court also erred because the 
failure to determine complete restitution is not a clerical error capable of being corrected 
under Rule 30(b). Rather, it was a judicial error and the Utah Supreme Court has 
confirmed that the determination of restitution requires "judicial reasoning and decision 
making." Thus, as a matter of law, the trial court was not permitted to correct its failure 
to determine complete restitution. 
{01027451-)} 2 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that an order to pay restitution is legally 
different from a trial court's determination of complete restitution. Mr. Nielsen is not 
appealing his obligation to pay restitution in installments as ordered by the trial court. He 
is appealing the trial court's decision that it made a clerical error when it failed to 
determine complete restitution and its decision to thereafter enter the court-ordered 
restitution amount as a civil judgment. Entering a civil judgment more than five years 
after sentencing is not only contrary to law, it is also unjust because Mr. Nielsen 
rightfully believed that the court-ordered restitution amount would never be converted 
into a civil judgment. The trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution in 
installments and allowing a civil judgment to be entered and enforced all at once will 
circumvent that restitution order. 
For these reasons, Mr. Nielsen requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
@ decision to enter a civil judgment. 
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in entering a civil judgment pursuant to Utah @ 
R. Crim. P. 30(b) when the failure to determine complete restitution is not a correctable 
clerical error and when it made findings of fact not supported by the record. 
Standard of Review: "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of 
law that we review for correctness." State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62,111,218 P.3d 610, 
613. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.289; Addn. A at 14-15.) 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in entering a civil judgment when it did not 
determine complete restitution. 
Standard of Review: "[I]n the case of restitution, a reviewing court will not 
disturb a district court,s determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed 
by law or abuses its discretion." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,110,214 P.3d 104, 108. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.163-170) 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions are set forth in Addendum D: 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401. 
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·Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
At the time of sentencing in 2010, the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay court-
ordered restitution. However, it is undisputed that the trial court did not review the 
required restitution factors, did not make corresp~nding findings of fact, and never 
determined "complete restitution." Over five years later, the State attempted to have the 
court-ordered restitution amount converted into a civil judgment. The trial court found 
that its failure to determine "complete restitution" in 2010 was a clerical error that could 
be corrected under Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). Based on its finding that the failure to 
determine complete restitution was a Rule 30(b) clerical error, the trial court entered a 
judgment on the civil judgment docket for the unpaid restitution amount. 
2. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Nielsen is Sentenced and Ordered to Pay Restitution in 2010 
On March 22, 2010, Mr. Nielsen pied guilty to the charge of theft. (R.27-34.) On 
July 26, 2010, the Court entered the Judgment and Commitment stating that Mr. Nielsen 
had pied guilty to the referenced offense and entering a sentence for a period of one ( 1) to 
fifteen (15) years. (R.59-60; Addn. B.) In addition, the Judgment and Commitment 
stayed the sentence and placed Mr. Nielsen on probation for a period of six (6) years. (R. 
60; Addn. B.) As part of probation, Mr. Nielsen was ordered to serve one year in the 
county jail and ordered to pay restitution to the victim Creekside Investments, Inc. 
("Creekside") in the amount of $346,248.58. (Id.) No findings of fact or any other 
analysis accompany the trial court's decision to enter this restitution amount. There is no 
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reference in the Judgment and Commitment that the trial court was making a finding of 
"complete restitution." 
On ~ovember 12, 20 I 0, following a review hearing, the trial court released Mr. 
Nielsen from jail and modified the court-ordered restitution as follows: 
That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to 
Creekside Funding. . . . Defendant shall pay 25% of his gross income as 
restitution up to an income of $120,000. If defendant's income is more 
than $120,000, restitution shall be reassessed. 
("Modified Restitution Order," R.125-126; Addn. C.) Again, no findings of fact or any 
other analysis accompany the trial court's decision to enter the above restitution amount. 
There is no reference in the Modified Restitution Order that the trial court was making a 
finding of "complete restitution." 
The State Requests the Trial Court Enter a Civil Judgment in 2015 
More than five years after sentencing, the State requested that the trial court enter 
a civil judgment in the amount of unpaid restitution and submitted a proposed civil 
judgment. (R.157.) Mr. Nielsen filed an objection to the entry of the civil judgment 
arguing that the trial court lacked authority to enter a civil judgment for the reasons set 
forth herein (the "Objection"). (R.161-181.) Following oral argument on the Objection, 
the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.289; Addn. A) and then 
entered a civil judgment on the civil judgment docket (the "Civil Judgment"). (R.207-
208.) 
The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions 
In analyzing the arguments of the parties, the Court made several material findings 
{01027451-1} 6 
and conclusions, which are numbered below. 
First, the trial court acknowledged that the relevant statutes and case law were not 
followed regarding the trial court's duty to determine complete restitution: 
I. Well, I find this frustrating because the statute just wasn't followed .... 
[State v.] Laycock seems to say that you have to [make a finding of 
complete restitution] ... and it didn't happen in this case and, so, it's 
messy to retroactively, five years later, go back and decide what to do. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5) (emphasis added). 
2. So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to 
whether restitution--the restitution number was complete, court-ordered 
or both. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4.) 
3. I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse 
of discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution, I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error 
for the Clerk to not record complete restitution as a judgment and 
nothing was called that. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4; 36:21 - 37:1.) 
4. 77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a defendant owes 
restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an order of complete 
restitution on the civil judgment docket. This didn't happen. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:9-12) (emphasis added). 
The trial court then acknowledged that "complete restitution" in this case would 
@ have been more than the amount of restitution Mr. Nielsen was ordered to pay: 
5. If anything, complete restitution would be more than this number. It 
wouldn't inure to the detriment of the defendant. It's--the restitution that 
was clearly court-ordered is the bottom amount that complete restitution 
could be. It certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed 
@ and complete restitution, if anything, would only be more. 
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(R.289; Addn. A at 35:18-23) (emphasis added). 
Regarding the State's argument that the trial court's failure to determine complete @ 
restitution at the time of sentencing could be remedied as a "clerical error" under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 30(b), the trial court stated: 
6. So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing to do because to 
correct it, as a clerical error, would be to say the Clerk should have done 
this because it's clear there should have been a complete restitution 
ordered, but nothing was called complete restitution and the statute and 
the Supreme Court has clearly said we're supposed to call things 
complete and court-ordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it 
difficult to say it was just a clerical error. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:9-16.) 
7. I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error for the Clerk to not 
record complete restitution as a judgment and nothing was called that. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:24 -37:1.) 
The trial court ultimately held that because Mr. Nielsen did not object that the trial 
court failed to make a finding of complete restitution that Mr. Nielsen therefore agreed 
the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment was the "complete 
restitution" amount: 
8. Well, I wish there were a cleaner record on this. I will just make the 
findings that I can from the information that I have and then rule the 
best that I can based on the record in this case. So there is not an 
explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to whether restitution--
the restitution number was complete, court-ordered or both. However, 
at the time and since then there was not a dispute as to the restitution 
amount and it was agreed upon by the parties at the time of sentencing 
and it hasn't been disputed. Amount has not ever been disputed. So this 
was an agreed upon amount. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 41 :23-8.) 
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To support its decision to enter a civil judgment pursuant Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b), 
the trial court made findings fact regarding the parties and the trial court's intentions and 
the alleged agreement from 20 I 0: 
9. In looking at Rule 30(b ), it states that you can correct a clerical mistake 
and when looking at what the factors are to determine if something is 
clerical, one is whether the order or judgment rendered reflects what 
was done or intended. I think that the restitution amount was clearly the 
one that was agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to 
order and that's what should have been. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 43 :3-9) ( emphasis added). 
10. Second, whether the error was the result of judicial reasoning or 
decision-making. I don't think this is. The Court should have called it 
complete and court-ordered, but the fact that everyone agreed to this 
number, I don't think there's a dispute about what the Court meant to do. 
This wasn't a Court decision to not enter it as a civil judgment. It 
should have happened and then, finally, whether the error is clear from 
the record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount was entered and 
it was n(?t entered as a civil judgment. 
So under Rule 30(b ), I'll say that this can be entered in the docket as a 
civil judgment. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 43:13-23) (emphasis added). 
However, the trial court failed to cite any part of the record to support its finding 
that Mr. Nielsen agreed that the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and 
Commitment would be considered "complete restitution" or to support its finding that the 
€i> trial court intended to determine complete restitution in 20 I 0. (See generally, R.289; 
Addn. A.) 
{01027451-1} 9 
Summary of the Argument 
In a criminal matter, the trial court has a "non-discretionary" d4ty to determine 
"complete restitution" and the failure to do so is reversible error. In this case, the 
Judgment and Commitment merely orders Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution, i.e., "court 
ordered restitution." The trial court never made a determination of complete restitution 
and in fact admits that it failed to make this required determination. Pursuant to Section 
77-38a-40 I (I), only orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment 
docket. ·Accordingly, the trial court erred when it entered the court-ordered restitution 
amount as a civil judgment. 
The trial court also erred by entering the civil judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. 
P. 30(b). The purpose of Rule 30(b) "is to correct clerical errors so that the record 
reflects what was actually 'done or intended."' First, only clerical errors, rather than 
judicial errors, can be corrected under Rule 30(b ). The Utah Supreme Court has 
confirmed "that the district court's determination of restitution require[s] judicial 
reasoning and decision making." Accordingly, the failure to determine complete 
restitution was a judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b ). 
Second, when analyzing an error under Rule 30(b ), the trial court may "not 
examine [the trial court's] intent where the written order is unequivocal." In this case, the 
Judgment and Commitment is unambiguous as it makes no reference to "complete 
restitution," the restitution factors listed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5), or 
reference any findings of fact which would support a determination of complete 
restitution. The Judgment and Commitment simply requires Mr. Nielsen to pay 
{01027451-1} 10 
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restitution which is legally different from a court's determination of complete restitution. 
Thus, the trial court erred when it reviewed extrinsic evidence of its intent when the 
orders at issues are unambiguous. 
Third, even if the failure to determine complete restitution was a correctable 
clerical error, and even if the trial court was permitted to review extrinsic evidence of its 
intent, there is still insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings 
that: (1) it intended to determine complete restitution: or (2) that Mr. Nielsen agreed that 
the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment would be considered 
"complete restitution" and therefore capable of being entered as a civil judgment. 
Because the record does not support the trial court's findings, this court must reverse. 
{01027451-1} 11 
1. 
Argument 
The Trial Court Has a Non-Discretionary Duty to Determine Complete 
Restitution and Only Orders of Complete Restitution can be Entered as Civil 
Judgments. 
In a criminal case, "restitution is mandated by statute and is a part of a criminal 
sanction imposed by the state." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 18,214 P.3d 104, 109. 
Trial courts are required ''to make two separate restitution determinations, one for 
complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution." Id. at iJ 20. ~'Court-
ordered restitution may be identical in amount to complete restitution, but it need not be 
so. The trial court has a non-discretionary duty to make a finding of complete restitution 
together with findings of fact supporting the determination." See State v. Barrett, 2004 
UT App 239, 2 (unpublished). "[A] court does not, however, have discretion to not make 
restitution determinations with supporting findings. By express language, the Act 
imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to make the appropriate determinations 
regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." Id. ( emphasis 
added); State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23 (Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-401(1) 
"commands ... that complete restitution be determined."). 
The Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act, at Section 77-3 8a-40 I ( 1 ), provides: 
Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Section 
77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to 
the parties. 
(Id.) (emphasis added); State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, n. 2 ("[§ 77-38a-401(1)] 
provides that the amount of complete restitution 'shall be entered' on the civil docket and 
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is enforceable as a civil judgment.") Thus, pursuant to Section 77-3 8a-40 I (1 ), only 
orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment docket. In this case, 
the trial court determined that it never entered an order of complete restitution. 
2. The Trial Court Erred When It Entered the Civil Judgment Pursuant to Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30(b ). 
2.1 Rule 30(b) Purpose and Standards. 
The purpose of Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure "is to correct 
clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually 'done or intended.'" State v. 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14,218 P.3d 610,614 (quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 
UT 36, ,r 30, 48 P.3d 218. Rule "30(b) is virtually identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a), and 
~ the 'clerical error' analysis under both sections is often indistinguishable." Rodrigues, 
2009 UT 62, n. 3; State v. Moya, 815 P .2d 1312, n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("review of an 
order based on either rule results in the same conclusion.") Accordingly, decisions 
analyzing clerical errors under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) and Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) will be 
discussed below. 
Because the trial court only has authority to correct "clerical" errors, it must 
determine whether the error is judicial or clerical in nature: 
[t]he distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering 
the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. A clerical error is 
one made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a judgment 
which does not conform to the actual intention of the court. On the other 
hand, a judicial error is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a 
substantively incorrect judgment. 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, 114 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also State v. 
Moya, 815 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("the substantive purpose of Rule 60(a) 
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of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to curing errors in accurately 
memorializing a judgment.") (emphasis in original). In sum, the "clerical error analysis 
generally focuses on ( 1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what 
was done or intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision 
making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14. 
2.2 The Failure to Determine Complete Restitution was the Result of 
Judicial Decision Making and Therefore Not Correctable Under Rule 
30(b). 
The failure to determine complete restitution is a judicial error, not a clerical error. 
"The distinction ... depends on whether [the error] was made in rendering the judgment 
or in recording the judgment as rendered." Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, 146, 
253 P.3d 1096, 1108; see also Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Co., 669 P.2d 
1201 (Utah 1983) (a clerical error "is a type of mistake or omission mechanical in nature 
which is apparent on the record and which does not involve a legal decision or 
judgment."). 
In this case, .the failure to determine complete restitution was not a mechanical 
mistake and or a clerical omission. Rather, it was an error in rendering a legal decision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed "that the district court's determination of 
restitution reguire(s] judicial reasoning and decision making." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ~ 
25 (emphasis added) (finding that trial court made a clerical error by miscalculating the 
amount of restitution). The determination of complete restitution is an act of judicial 
decision making which requires the trial to review the restitution factors, determine 
complete restitution, and then support its determination with findings of fact. See Utah 
{01027451-1} 14 
@ 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302; State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2. It is an act in rendering 
a judicial decision, not an act in recording one. 
In this case, the trial court entered the Civil Judgment pursuant to Rule 30(b) 
because it ruled that the failure to determine complete restitution was a clerical error. 
~ This was error because the trial court's failure to determine complete restitution was a 
clear judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b). For this reason alone, 
the trial court's decision to enter a civil judgment must be reversed. 
2.3 There is No Evidence in the Record Indicating That the Trial Court 
Actually Intended to Make a Determination of Complete Restitution. 
In order to enter the Civil Judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 3 O(b ), the trial court 
(i) was required to determine whether it "actually intended" to determine complete 
restitution. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,r 14; Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 
1984) ("The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose 
of reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties."). Even if the failure to 
determine complete restitution is a "clerical" error, there is no evidence in the record that 
the trial court intended to determine complete restitution. 
2.3.1 Because the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified 
Restitution Order Are Unambiguous it is Improper to Consider 
the Trial Court's Intent. 
Although the purpose of Rule 30(b) is to determine what the trial court actually 
intended, the trial court is not permitted to explore what was intended unless the language 
of the judgement is ambiguous. State ex rel. C.S.B., 2000 UT App 362, ,r 9, 17 P.3d 1131, 
@ 1133 ("[w]here the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given 
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effect as it is written.") (analyzing Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) and 
citing State v. Denney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
In State v. Denny, the issue was whether the duration of defendant's probation was 
for a period of 18 months or 3 years. The probation order stated that the defendant "be 
placed on probation for a period of three (3) years .... " Denney, 776 P.2d at 92. 
However, the Utah Court of Appeals found that"[ a ]fter reviewing the record, it appears 
that the trial court may have intended to sentence defendant to two consecutive terms of 
probation lasting eighteen months each" because the trial court stated on the record that 
"[t]he eighteen months probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively." Id. 
at 92-93. But despite the strong evidence of the trial court's intention that probation last 
only 18 months, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to alter the unambiguous probation 
order. It reasoned that: 
'Where the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be 
given effect as it is written .... ' ( citing State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 466, 659 
P.2d 918, 923 (App.1983). It is necessary that sentences be rendered with 
clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the possibility of confusion and 
injustice. 
Broad and uniform recognition has been given to the precept that a sentence 
imposed by a court acting in a criminal case should be definite, unequivocal 
and unambiguous, so that both the defendant and the officials charged with 
executing the sentence will be fairly apprised of the intentions of the court. 
This principle was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363, 46 S.Ct. 156, 157, 70 L.Ed. 
309 (1926), where the Court held that "[s]entences in criminal cases should 
reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious 
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.'' However, "'where the 
meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other documents of record may be 
reviewed for purposes of construing the meaning of the judgment.' ( quoting 
Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923.) 
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Id. at 93. The Denny Court then articulated the rule that "we do not examine [the trial 
court's] intent where the written order is unequivocal." Id. 
In this case, the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified Restitution Order 
are unambiguous. Neither order makes any reference to "complete restitution," the 
restitution factors listed in Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5), or reference any findings of 
fact which would support a determination of complete restitution. These orders simply 
require Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution which is legally different from a court's 
determination of complete restitution. See State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23. Because 
these orders make no reference to complete restitution, they are unequivocal and 
unambiguous on this point. As a result, the trial court erred by looking to the record in an 
attempt to ascertain whether it actually intended to determine complete restitution, and 
then ultimately erred by entering the Civil Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). 
2.3.2 There is No Evidence in the Record Indicating That the Trial 
Court Actually Intended to Make a Determination of Complete 
Restitution. 
Even if it the Judgment and Commitment and the Modified Restitution Order were 
somehow ambiguous there is still no evidence in the record indicating that the trial court 
intended to determine complete restitution. First, the record does not support a finding 
~ that the trial court intended to determine complete restitution because the trial court 
admitted that "it didn't happen in this case" and that "the statute just wasn't followed": 
Well, I find this frustrating because the statute just wasn't followed .... 
[State v.] Laycock seems to say that you have to [make a finding of 
complete restitution] ... and it didn't happen in this case and, so, it's messy 
to retroactively, five years later, go back and decide what to do. 
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(R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5.) 
So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in this case as to whether 
restitution--the restitution number was complete, court-ordered or both. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4.) 
I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse of 
discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution .... 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:2-4; 36:21 - 37: 1.) 
77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a defendant owes 
restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an order of complete 
restitution on the civil judgment docket. This didn't happen. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 42:9-12) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find that the trial court intended to 
determine complete restitution when no attempt was made to comply with Utah Code 
Ann.§§ 77-38a-401 or 77-38a-302(5). 
It is also very difficult to find that the trial court intended to determine complete 
restitution when it found that the complete restitution amount would have been greater 
than the $346,248 restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment: 
If anything, complete restitution would be more than this number. . . . It 
certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed and complete 
restitution, if anything, would only be more. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 35:18-23) (emphasis added). 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the trial court did not intend to determine 
complete restitution is the trial court's own statements which demonstrate just how 
unclear the record was regarding the trial court's intent in 2010: 
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I don't think there is a clean answer here. I think it's deficient, but that it 
wasn't objected to. So I really don't think there is a clean answer. I don't 
find anything that satisfactory in either direction. Because it seems 
enforceable, both sides agreed to it. It seems unfair to dispute it now, but 
you know various things went wrong. 
So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing to do because to correct 
it, as a clerical error, would be to say the Clerk should have done this 
because it's clear there should have been a complete restitution ordered, but 
nothing was called complete restitution and the statute and the Supreme 
Court has clearly said we're supposed to call things complete and court-
ordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it difficult to say it was just a 
clerical error. 
If anyone has any brilliant proposals here, I'm happy to hear it, but it just 
seems like there are problems with it that make a clear answer difficult. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:3-19.) 
I just have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an abuse of 
discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution, I have a hard time saying it was just a clerical error for the Clerk 
to not record complete restitution as a judgment and nothing was called 
that. 
(R.289; Addn. A at 36:21-25 - 37:1.) 
But despite the fact that the record did not support a finding that the trial court 
intended to determine complete restitution, the trial court nevertheless entered the Civil 
Judgment under Rule 30(b) because it believed that "the restitution amount was clearly 
the one that was agreed upon by the parties": 
In looking at Rule 30(b ), it states that you can correct a clerical mistake and 
when looking at what the factors are to determine if something is clerical, 
one is whether the order or judgment rendered reflects what was done or 
intended. I think that the restitution amount was clearly the one that was 
agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to order and that's 
what should have been. 
(43:3-9) 
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The Court should have called it complete and court-ordered, but the fact 
that everyone agreed to this number, I don't think there's a dispute about 
what the Court meant to do. This wasn't a Court decision to not enter it as 
a civil judgment. It should have happened and then, finally, whether the 
error is clear from the record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount 
was entered and it was not entered as a civil judgment. 
So under Rule 30(b ), I'll say that this can be entered in the docket as a civil 
judgment. 
( 4 3: 14-23) ( emphasis added) 
The trial court erred. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Nielsen 
stipulated or agreed that the restitution amount listed in the Judgment and Commitment 
would be considered "complete restitution" and therefore capable of being entered as a 
civil judgment. The trial court failed to support its findings with any citation to the 
record. The trial court was unable to adequately support its findings because it never 
complied with Utah Code§§ Section 77-38a-401(1), 77-38a-302(5)(a)-(b), or State v. 
Laycock, 2009 UT 53, by analyzing the restitution factors and making findings of fact 
supporting its restitution determination. The only potential evidence the trial court raised 
was the plea agreement1 but that document does not list any restitution amount that could 
have been agreed to by Mr. Nielsen. (R.27-34.) In sum, the trial court decided to enter 
the Civil Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) based on its finding that the parties 
agreed to the restitution amount and that finding is incorrect. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009 
UT 62,111,218 P.3d 610,613. {"The interpretation of [Rule 30(b)] is a question oflaw 
that we review for correctness.") 
1 
"What about the plea agreement though that gives that number that everyone signed, the 
statement of defendant?" (R 31 :20-22.) 
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For these reasons, the trial court's application of Rule 30(b) is not supported by 
the record, is legally incorrect, and therefore the trial court's decision to enter the Civil 
Judgment must be reversed. 
3. The Trial Court Erred when it Entered the Civil Judgment Because it Never 
Made a Finding of "Complete Restitution". 
Utah Code Section 77-38a-401(1) "commands ... that complete restitution be 
determined" and the trial court has a "nondiscretionary duty" "to make the appropriate 
determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." See 
State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2. In addition, pursuant to Section 77-38a-401(1), 
only orders of "complete restitution" can be entered on the civil judgment docket. 
In this case, there can be no dispute that the trial court did not determine 
"complete restitution" and did not enter an "order of complete restitution." There can be 
no dispute because the trial court actually found that Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-401(1) 
''just wasn't followed" and that, with respect to whether it made a finding of complete 
restitution in 2010, the trial court found that "it just didn't happen." (R.289; Addn. A at 
34:23 - 35:5, 42:9-12.) 
The record supports the trial court's finding that it failed to determine complete 
restitution and failed to enter an order of complete restitution. First, there is no order 
@ entered on the docket titled "Order of Complete Restitution" or any order or judgment 
indicating that the Court made a finding of"complete restitution." Neither the Judgment 
and Commitment nor the Modified Restitution Order make any reference to "complete 
restitution." 
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Second, under Section 77-38a-401(1), when the trial court makes a finding of 
complete restitution, that order must be entered on the civil judgment docket. But the 
fact that neither Judgment and Commitment nor the Modified Restitution Order was 
entered on the civil judgment docket establishes that the trial court did not enter an order 
of complete restitution. Indeed, if it had, then there would be a preexisting civil 
judgment. 
Third, as set forth above, trial courts are required "to make two separate restitution 
determinations, one for complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution." 
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, 120. "Unlike complete restitution, court-ordered 
restitution may be adjusted to take the defendant's ability to pay into account." Id. at 1 
30. In this case, the Modified Restitution Order modified the terms of restitution set forth 
in the Judgment and Commitment by setting the restitution payments to be equal to "25% 
of his gross income ... up to an income of $120,000." (R.60; Addn. B.) The trial court 
likely made this adjustment to account for Mr. Nielsen's inability to pay the entire 
restitution amount all at once. But the simple fact that the Judgment and Commitment 
was adjusted at all definitively establishes that there was no finding of "complete 
restitution" because the trial court could not modify "complete restitution" orders as a 
matter of law. 
Fourth, "[a] court's 'determination' of restitution is different from ordering a 
defendant to pay restitution." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,123. Here, is undisputed 
that the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution in 20 IO through the Judgment 
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and Commitment. The fact that the trial court ordered Mr. Nielsen to pay restitution is 
legally different from the trial court's obligation to determine restitution 
Fifth, in determining complete restitution, "a district court looks to section 77-
38a-302(5) for the factors it must consider": 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or niental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that 
are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade 
that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current 
employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 20 (quoting§ 77-38a-302(5)(a)-(b).) 
After the trial court considers and reviews these restitution factors, it is then 
required to enter an order of "complete restitution" supported by findings of fact. It is 
reversible error if the district court does not support an order of complete restitution "with 
supporting findings ... along with the rationale to explain the decision." See State v. 
Barrett, 2004 UT App 239, 2; State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ,r 23. 
In State v. Barrett, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "[ u ]nder the plain 
language of the (Utah Crime Victims Restitution] Act, a court does not, however, have 
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discretion to not make restitution determinations with supporting findings. By express 
language, the Act imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a judge to make the appropriate ~ 
determinations regarding restitution, along with the rationale to explain the decision." Id. 
The Barrett Court then held that the trial court erred when it failed to make a finding of 
complete restitution and when it failed to "explain [its] rationale with findings on the 
required factors made on the record." Id. at 2. Thus, the failure to determine complete 
restitution and the failure to support that determination with findings of fact is reversible 
error under Barrett. 
7 
In State v. Laycock, the trial court did not determine complete restitution because 
of the "difficulty of ascertaining complete restitution based on incomplete facts and 
speculation." State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,, 23. In response the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]he statute2 commands, however, that complete restitution be determined." 
Id. The Court then held that: 
A court's 'determination' of restitution is different from ordering a 
defendant to pay restitution. After determining complete restitution, a 
district court judge may then order court-ordered restitution as part of the 
criminal sentence based on facts that would meet the same strict 
requirements as found in a civil setting. 
Here, Judge Laycock failed to make a determination of complete 
restitution. This was error. She was clearly required to determine complete 
restitution, as set out in Utah Code section 78-38a-302(2). 
Id. at 1123-24 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court did not make any attempt to "determine" complete 
restitution, review the restitution factors, or issue findings of fact supporting a 
2 Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302. 
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determination of complete restitution. In fact, the trial court admitted it did not perform 
any of these non-discretionary acts. (R.289; Addn. A at 34:23 - 35:5, 42:9-12.) 
Accordingly, the trial court did not make a finding of complete restitution. This is 
reversible error under Laycock and Barrett. Because only orders of "complete 
restitution" can be entered as civil judgments and because the trial court never 
determined "complete restitution," the trial court's decision to enter the Civil Judgment 
must be reversed. 
Conclusion and Relief Requested 
"It is necessary that sentences be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to 
avoid the possibility of confusion and injustice." State v. Denney, 776 P.2d at 93. The 
Judgment and Commitment was rendered with clarity and accuracy demonstrating that 
the trial unequivocally intended to enter "court-ordered" restitution and did not intend to 
@ enter a civil judgment. From the time of sentencing and for over five years thereafter, 
Mr. Nielsen believed in good faith that the trial court did not intend to determine 
complete restitution and therefore would never enter a civil judgment. Indeed, because 
the trial court never reviewed the restitution factors, never made findings of fact, and 
never determined complete restitution, Mr. Nielsen had no reason or cause to object to 
the hypothetical entry of a civil judgment. Mr. Nielsen relied on the trial court's clear 
decision, but now he and his wife face the prospect of losing their marital home through 
the complete enforcement of the newly entered Civil Judgment - a judgment that 
circumvents and violates the trial court's "court-ordered" restitution order requiring Mr. 
Nielsen to pay restitution in installments. This is an injustice that Denny and Utah Courts 
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seek to avoid. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred when it when it entered the court-
ordered restitution amount as a civil judgment because it never previously made a 
determination of complete restitution. The trial court erred by entering the Civil 
Judgment pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) because the failure to determine complete 
restitution was a judicial error which cannot be corrected through Rule 30(b ). 
This court should reverse the trial court's decision to enter the Civil Judgment. 
Dated this 1st day of August 2016. 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
Timothy R. Pack 
Attorneys for Defendant Gary W. Nielsen 
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Hearl ng - May 9, 2016 
1 The second argument they make is that there is a 
2 clerical error that the Court can fix. It's a 30(b) argument. Mr. 
3 Bates says the Clerk failed to fulfill her statutorily mandated 
4 duty to enter the restitution amount on the civil judgment docket 
5 and Mr. Bates cites to the Rodriguez case and I think that's tab 
6 4 in the binder I gave you. I'm going to turn to it really quick. 
7 It's paragraph 14. 
8 So at paragraph 14 of the second sentence says in our 
9 analysis. In our analysis under Rule 30(b), we draw a distinction 
10 between clerical errors and judicial errors. A distinction 
11 depends on whether the error was made in rendering the judgment 
12 or in recording the judgment as rendered. A clerical error is one 
13 made in recording a judgment that results in the entry of a 
14 judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the 
15 Court. On the other hand, a judicial error is one made in 
16 rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect 
17 judgment. 
18 So in Rodriguez, in that case the defendant agreed that 
19 restitution was a certain amount and the actual restitution that 
20 was entered reflected a different amount. It was a typo and we 
21 know that under Laycock and Barrett failure to follow the 
22 statutory requirements make those findings of fact. That's not a 
23 clerical error. That's not a typo. That is in the judicial realm 
24 of error. 
25 That's not a clerical error and the Rodriguez court 
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1 also looked at three factors in its 30(b) analysis, one of which 
2 is whether the Court's order reflects what was intended. We don't 
3 know what was intended. There is no findings of fact. 
4 Mr. Bates wasn't counsel of record at that time. I 
5 wasn't counsel of record at that time. So we don't know what was 
6 intended. There's no evidence in the record to base that decision 
7 on. This is not a clerical issue and the Clerk did not make a 
8 mistake. There was no order of complete restitution to enter on 
9 the civil judgment docket. 
10 We think this is an issue of protecting substantive 
11 rights and substantive procedure which was not followed in this 
12 case and procedure when not followed is reversible error under 
13 Laycock and Barrett. 
14 I just want to make a couple final points here. We also 
15 object to the interest calculation. We've pointed out that no 
16 interest should be accruing on this court-ordered restitution 
17 amount. Restitution was ordered as part of Mr. Nielsen's 
18 probation. There's no mention of interest or that interest should 
19 accrue. There's no civil judgment entered wherein post-judgment 
20 interest could accrue and the State didn't oppose this argument 
21 in their response to our objection. So I think this point is 
22 conceded and, as of today, we calculate the principle amount 
23 being owed as $265,089.00. 
24 Last point, Your Honor. Excuse me. I talk too much. The 
25 State also conceded that under Utah Code 77-38A-302.5 the Court 
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1 obligation to order that that judgment be put on the civil 
2 judgment docket so that she can do that because it should have 
3 been done is years ago. 
4 
5 
6 
MR. PACK: May I respond, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh [affirmative]. 
MR. PACK: And I have a draft of this proposed 
7 stipulation if the Court wants to see what we're talking about.: 
8 Again, Dr. Maw is not the victim. She does not have any rights 
9 here. Mr. Bates does not have an obligation to stick up for her 
10 and to pursue her rights. She is a third-party commercial 
11 
12 
creditor. 
MR. BATES: Judge, should we get Dr. Maw on the phone? 
13 I feel like maybe she needs to be heard here because I think she 
14 would take a very different path from that. 
15 MR. PACK: Ms. Maw could have submitted an affidavit. 
16 She could have been here herself if it was that important. 
17 THE COURT: Well, let me read this and I'm not sure if 
18 it matters to me whether she's an indirect victim or if she was 
19 the direct victim. I think the real issue is whether proper 
20 findings were made. Let me just look at these two cases a little 
21 more closely. 
22 
23 
[Long pause. ] 
THE COURT: Well, I find this frustrating because the 
24 statute just wasn't followed and it seems like we have a wide-
25 spread practice of not following the statute. You know, we•re 
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1 routinely in statements of defendants not specifying complete and 
2 court-ordered restitution or making findings to support it and 
3 this case, Laycock, seems to say that you have to do that and it 
4 didn't happen in this case and, so, it•s messy to retroactively, 
5 five years later, go back and decide what to do. 
6 So the statute wasn't followed precisely at the time, 
7 No one disagreed to that. No one objected to that until five 
8 years later. So defendant was participating and didn't say, hey. 
9 I need some findings or I object to this number or I object to 
10 the way that this is happening. 
11 So it leaves a question now of what to do with this and 
12 it does seem that the entry onto the civil docket is really just 
13 something that's supposed to happen. It's not a decision the 
14 Judge needs to make. It's something that's supposed to happen 
15 after you have a restitution order and the statute is a little· 
16 ambiguous when it says once the judge decides that restitution is 
17 owed the clerk is supposed to enter a civil judgment of complete 
18 restitution. If anything, complete restitution would be more than 
19 this number. It wouldn't inure to the detriment of the defendant. 
20 It•s--the restitution that was clearly court-ordered is 
21 the bottom amount that complete restitution could be. It 
22 certainly has to be supported by the facts of what was owed and 
23 complete restitution, if anything, would only be more. Court-
24 ordered restitution, if anything, would be less determining the 
25 defendant's circumstances which wasn't done. So all it can be is 
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1 complete restitution based on the information that was before the 
2 Court. 
3 I don•t think there is a clean answer here. I think 
4 it's deficient, but that it wasn't objected to. So I really don't 
5 think there is a clean answer. I don't find anything that 
6 satisfactory in either direction. Because it seems enforceable,· 
7 both sides agreed to it. It seems unfair to dispute it now, but 
8 you know various things went wrong. 
9 So I really am not--I'm not certain of the right thing 
10 to do because to correct it, as a clerical error, would be to say 
11 the Clerk should have done this because it's clear there should 
12 have been a complete restitution ordered, but nothing was called 
13 complete restitution and the statute and the Supreme Court has 
14 clearly said we're supposed to call things complete and court-
15 ordered and that didn't happen. So it makes it difficult to say 
16 it was just a clerical error. 
17 If anyone has any brilliant proposals here, I'm happy 
18 to hear it, but it just seems like there are problems with it 
19 that make a clear answer difficult. The best proposal seems to be 
20 what Mr. Nielsen is agreeing to be held to. It does prevent the 
21 victim from going after assets unless he defaults, but I just 
22 have a hard time when I have these clear cases saying it's an 
23 abuse of discretion not to lay out what is complete restitution 
24 and court-ordered restitution, I have a hard time saying it was 
25 just a clerical error for the Clerk to not record complete 
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1 restitution as a judgment and nothing was called that. 
2 Do you have any response to that? I mean the problem is 
3 it's a common practice and it would make many, many restitution 
4 orders insufficient. 
5 MR. BATES: Judge, I don't think it•s an abuse of 
6 discretion where nobody is disputing the number and again I'll 
7 just point out that Laycock and Barrett were contested 
8 restitution cases. There's not a case that anyone can point to 
9 where everybody agreed on restitution, but the Court of Appeals 
10 or the Supreme Court faulted the trial court for not making 
11 findings and not, you know, holding a hearing or making--going 
12 through all the factors again and under subsection (4) of 301, I 
13 think that clearly puts the onus on the defendant. When that 
14 doesn't happen and he doesn't object, everything is kind of 
15 washed. 
16 So that seems to me to be the solution here is that 
17 everybody kind of agreed to this and I take just one issue with 
18 the Court's styling of the Clerk's obligation. Under 404(1) there 
19 doesn't have to be restitution ordered. It simply says that upon 
20 the Judge determining restitution. So once he determines this is 
21 restitution, the Clerk is responsible to go enter the order. 
22 
23 
MR. PACK: If I could respond. 
TU COURT: So one question for Mr. Bates first. So 
24 what happens in the general case where you don't have a specific 
25 complete and court-ordered restitution identified? Once there's 
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1 restitution and it's just one number, does the Clerk just assume 
2 that's the complete restitution number and enter that? 
3 MR. BATES: There's no other number. There's no reason, 
4 I mean there's nothing in 301 prohibiting the Court from just 
5 saying this is the number, you know, and calling that court-
6 ordered and complete restitution. It talks about making those 
7 deteminations separately, but at the end of the day there's 
8 nothing says it has to enter two separate numbers and if the 
9 Court says this is the number, then I think the way the statute 
10 is, that's the number for all intents and purposes and the Clerk, 
11 in fact, if you look at 401. Again, 401(1) gives us the Clerk's 
12 obligation. 
13 When it talks about the Judge's determination and the 
14 first part of that phrase, it doesn't distinguish between court-
15 ordered or complete restitution. It doesn't say when the Judge 
16 detemines complete restitution. It just says when the Judge 
17 determines restitution the Clerk shall go enter an order of 
18 complete restitution in the civil judgment docket which seems to 
19 suggest that if the Court only gives you one number, that's the 
20 number. 
21 'l'BE COURT: That's what you enter. Okay. All right. 
22 We're going to take one quick break. I will hear you when I get 
23 back. 
24 
25 
MR. PACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
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MR. PACK: So I think the Court--I think the Court gave 
3 a hypothetical; that this was maybe occurring quite a bit and you 
4 wanted to know what to do in a situation where there is an order 
5 of restitution entered, but there's no distinction between 
6 whether it's complete restitution or court-ordered restitution. 
7 In a situation like that, I think the Court and the 
8 parties can presume that it's complete restitution when that 
9 civil judgment is recorded. It's presumed and that would have 
10 been the same way in our case, but--sorry. One second. Let me get 
11 'ttrf notes here. 
12 You know, we have a situation where there were on 
13 findings. There was no statement between--that was in the order 
14 of restitution that differentiated between complete restitution 
15 and court-ordered restitution and no civil judgment was entered. 
16 So I think the presumption is that it wasn't complete restitution 
17 and I think it's the filing of that civil judgment which triggers 
18 the defendant's obligation to object to that. 
19 I mean, in our case we have no civil judgment entered. 
20 So we had no duty to object. So it's not like we waited five 
21 years to object to this judgment. We objected immediately. We 
22 weren't even put on notice to object to the civil judgment. 
23 THE COURT: Well, to the civil judgment, but was there 
24 ever an objection to the restitution amount? 
25 MR. PACK: We presume that this was court-ordered 
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1 restitution. We have been put on notice that this is court-
2 ordered restitution because no civil judgment was entered. The 
3 Nielsens, specifically Verna Nielsen, has been making upgrades to 
4 her property starting this business under the assumption that 
5 there was no final judgment which could come and take her 
6 property away. Five years later, now that's changing and the 
7 burden to object did not arise or notice to object did not arise 
8 at the time of sentencing. It arose five years later and we're 
9 timely objecting now. 
10 THE COURT: I don•t think there is any notice that a 
11 civil judgment will be entered. It appears to just be automatic 
12 upon a finding of restitution. The Clerk does it. Once the Judge 
13 determines that restitution is owed, the Clerk just goes in, 
14 enters the judgment. There's no notice. There's nothing to object 
15 to. It just happens. It just happened to not take place here. 
16 MR. PACK: Right, but I mean if the Court is trying to 
17 figure out whether it's court-ordered or complete restitution, we 
18 have no findings of fact to know and I think there's every reason 
19 to believe the actual complete restitution amount could have been 
20 higher. We just don't know. There was just nothing to object to 
21 at that time. There was no document that says final civil 
22 judgment. 
23 If the Court has any other questions. 
24 THE COURT: No, that's all. Anything left that you'd 
25 like to say, Mr. Bates? 
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1 MR. BATES: Just that I understand Mr. Pack was not 
2 counsel of record at the time this happened. It strikes me as odd 
3 that the defendant would go forward under that assumption; that 
4 the Court has violated its obligation and used its discretion in 
5 not making a complete restitution finding and not having the 
6 Clerk enter that same judgment. That was his thinking going 
7 forward, that there was some sort of detrimental reliance upon 
8 the Court not fulfilling its statutory obligation. I guess I'm 
9 doubtful that actually would occur. 
10 MR. PACK: And my last point. I know this is a tough 
11 issue and I think our proposal is the best issue. I think it 
12 avoids it picking up a lot of dust, I think, if one party or the 
13 other is going to definitely appeal this because this is an 
14 unsettled question and let the Court of Appeals decide this, but 
15 I think our proposal can avoid that and can be a win/win for 
16 everyone. 
17 TBB COURT: And have the parties discussed that? 
18 Because there's a risk of that. There is a risk. 
19 MR. BATES: I've had that discussion with the victim, 
2 0 Your Honor. 
21 
22 
23 
TBE COURT: Okay. 
[Long pause.] 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I wish there were a 
24 cleaner record on this. I will just make the findings that I can 
25 from the information that I have and then rule the best that I 
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l can based on the record in this case. 
2 So there is not an explicit finding in the judgment in 
3 this case as to whether restitution--the restitution number was 
4 complete, court-ordered or both. However, at the time and since 
5 then there was not a dispute as to the restitution amount and it 
6 was agreed upon by the parties at the time of sentencing and it 
7 hasn't been disputed • .Amount has not ever been disputed. So this 
8 was an agreed upon amount. 
9 77-38A-401 says upon the Court determining that a 
10 defendant owes restitution, the Clerk of the Court shall enter an 
11 order of complete restitution on the civil judgment docket. This 
12 didn't happen. I do think it's important that that statute says 
13 upon the Court determining that a defendant owes restitution. It 
14 doesn't specifically say that upon the Court labeling a 
15 restitution amount as complete, that then the Clerk must go ahead 
16 and enter that. It says as soon as the Court determines that a 
17 defendant owes restitution, the Clerk shall order that as a civil 
18 judgment. 
19 I will note here this before me today is not a dispute 
20 about a restitution a mount. It's a dispute as to whether it is 
21 appropriate to enter a civil judgment at this time and looking at 
22 the statute, it's clear that this is supposed to be an automatic 
23 function. This is something that the Clerk is supposed to 
24 automatically do as soon as the Court determines that restitution 
25 is owed. It's not something that there's any particular notice. 
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1 It's just something that happens after sentencing and for 
2 whatever reason this didn't happen. 
3 In looking at Rule 30{b), it states that you can 
4 correct a clerical mistake and when looking at what the factors 
5 are to determine if something is clerical, one is whether the 
6 order or judgment rendered reflects what was done or intended. I 
7 think that the restitution amount was clearly the one that was 
8 agreed upon by the parties and that the Court intended to order 
9 and that's what should have been. Barring some different, lesser 
10 order, lesser amount that was ordered as court-ordered 
11 restitution, that's what should have been placed on the civil 
12 judgment docket. 
13 Second, whether the error was the result of judicial 
14 reasoning or decision-making. I don't think this is. The Court 
15 should have called it complete and court-ordered, but the fact 
16 that everyone agreed to this number, I don't think there's a 
17 dispute about what the Court meant to do. This wasn't a Court 
18 decision to not enter it as a civil judgment. It should have 
19 happened and then, finally, whether the error is clear from the 
20 record. I think it's clear that this restitution amount was 
21 entered and it was not entered as a civil judgment. 
22 So under Rule 30(b), I'll say that this can be entered 
23 in the docket as a civil judgment. 
24 Mr. Bates, since you have agreed to adopt the number 
25 that is without interest, what is that number and are both sides 
THACKER TRANSCRIPTS 
801-285-949& / thackertranscripts@gmall.com 
43 
ADDENDUMB 
@ 
ADDENDUMB 
-~ 
DAVID R. BRJCKEY, #6188 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Justice Center 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone (435) 615-3828 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGMENTANDCOMMITMENT 
PLAINTIFF 
vs. 
GARY WILLIAM NIELSEN, 
D.O.B. 02-24-44 
DEFENDANT. 
Criminal No. 091500159 
Judge 
On the 26th day of July, 2010, David R. Brickey, Summit County Attorney, attorney for the 
State of Utah, and the defendant, by and through counsel, Gail E. Laser, appeared before the above 
court for sentencing. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon plea of guilty to the offense 
ofTheft, a Second Degree Felony. The Court having asked if the defendant had anything to say why 
judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or 
appearing to the court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
00005~ 
-~ 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison for a period of 
one (1) to fifteen (15) years as provided by law for the offense of which the defendant is adjudged 
guilty. 
IT IS ORDERED that the execution of the foregoing sentence is stayed and the defendant is 
placed on probation with the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for a period 
of six (6) years under the following tenns and conditions, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-18-
1, et. seq. 
1. That the defendant maintain good behavior and have no violations of any laws; 
2. That the defendant comply with all terms and conditions imposed by Adult Probation 
and Parole; 
3. That the defendant serve one (1) year in the Summit County Jail with commitment 
to issue forthwith; 
4. That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to Creekside 
Funding, c/o Rick Arnold, S255 West 11000 North, Suite 100, Highland, Utah, 
84003; 
S. That the defendant not practice law in the State of Utah without the approval of the 
Utah State Bar. 
,'I, 
DATED this c:U'ctay of July, 2010. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this 
__ day of July, 2010, to the following: 
Gail E. Laser 
P.O. Box 566 
Park City, Utah 84060-566 000060 
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DAVID R. BRICKEY, #6188 
Summit County Attorney 
PAUL R. CHRlSTENSEN, #5677 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Summit County Justice Center 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone (435) 615-3828 
Facsimile (435) 615-3833 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
in and for SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF 
VS. 
GARY WILLIAM NIELSEN, 
D.O.B. 02-24-44 
DEFENDANT. 
ORDER MODIFYING TERMS 
AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
Criminal No. 091500 I 59 
Judge 
Having heretofore adjudged the defendant guilty ofthe offense ofTheft, a Second Degree Felony, 
the Court on the 26th day of July, 2010, imposed sentence on said defendant that the defendant be placed 
on probation with the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for a period of six years 
under various tenns and conditions. 
On the 8th day of November, 2010, the defendant appeared in person and with counsel, Joseph 
Wrona, for a review hearing. The State of Utah was represented by Paul R. Christensen, Summit County @ 
Prosecuting Attomey. Upon review of the matter, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant's previous sentence be modified 
as foJJows: 
O001.l 25 
@ 
-~ 
1. That the defendant complete all terms and conditions previously imposed on July 26, 20 IO; 
2. That the defendant be released from the Summit County Jail on November 8, 20 IO; 
3. That the defendant pay restitution in the amount of $346,248.58 to Creekside Funding, c/o 
Rick Arnold, S2SS W-QO North, Suite I 00, Highland, Utah, 84003. Defendant shall 
pay 25% of his Jdi g oss income as restitution up to an income of $120,000. If 
defendant's income is more than $120,000, restitution shall be reassessed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court reserves the right to make further orders in 
connection with this matter. 
DATED this~~ay of November, 2010. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Terms and 
~tions of Probation in the matter of State of Utah v. Gary William Nielsen, postage prepaid, this 
.n:_ day of November, 2010, to the following: 
Joseph E. Wrona 
WRONA LAW FIRM, PC 
174S Sidewinder Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment--lnterest--Civil actions--Lien, UT ST § 77-38a-401 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 4. Restitution Judgments 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-401 
§ 77-38a-401. Entry of judgment--Interest--Civil actions--Lien 
Currentness 
(I) Upon the court determining that a defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of complete 
restitution as defined in Section 77-38a-302 on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(2) The order shall be considered a legal judgment, enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, 
the department may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution order 
as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue 
collection of the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover collection and reasonable attorney fees. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection 77-18-6(l)(b)(v) and Sections 78B-2-311 and 78B-5-202, a judgment ordering restitution 
when entered on the civil judgment docket shall have the same affect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment in a 
civil action and expires only upon payment in full, which includes applicable interest, collection fees, and attorney fees. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing, including prejudgment interest. This Subsection 
(4) applies to all restitution judgments not paid in full on or before May 12, 2009. 
(5) The department shall make rules permitting the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder 
of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Credits 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2208, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 111, § 1, eff. May 
12, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 37, § 1, eff. May 10, 2011. 
Notes of Decisions (6) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-401, UT ST§ 77-38a-401 
Current through 2016 Second Special Session 
End of Document 
WESTLAW 
,\' 2016 Thtltll:.tm Ri:utcrs. ~o daim to ori!!inal C.S. Government Work:-.. 
